


# Measuring Query Name Minimization

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# Quick Summary

## NON-query name minimisation resolution sequence



# Quick Summary


Query name minimisation technique described in RFC 7816

Instead of sending the full QNAME and the original QTYPE upstream, a resolver that implements QNAME minimisation and does not already have the answer in its cache sends a request to the name server authoritative for the closest known ancestor of the original QNAME. The request is done with:

- o the QTYPE NS
- o the QNAME that is the original QNAME, stripped to just one label more than the zone for which the server is authoritative

# Quick Summary

Query name minimisation technique described in RFC 7816



# Common Resolver Implementation Status

- BIND 9
  - Implemented in 9.14, active in “relaxed” mode by default
- Unbound
  - Implemented in 1.7.2, active in “non-strict” mode
- Knot
  - Implemented in 1.2.2, active by default
- Power DNS Recursor
  - Implemented in 4.3.0-alpha1, enabled by default since 4.3.0-beta 1

# Common Resolver Implementation Status

- BIND 9

- Implemented in 9.11.2

- Unbound

it looks like all recursive resolvers that use up-to-date versions of these code bases should be doing query name minimisation by default these days.

- PowerDNS

What do we see?

4.3.0-alpha1, enabled by default since 4.3.0-beta 1

# Measurement

Let's look at the adoption of query name minimisation from the perspectives of the end user and their queries, and from the perspective of recursive resolvers

# Users whose Queries are handled with Qname Minimization

2019 Results

Experiments	Qmin	Query Type			
		NS	A	AAAA	
429,773,288	11,089,823	2,811,053	8,336,008	1,721	
	3%	1%	2%	0%	% of all experiments
		25%	75%	0%	% of Qmin experiments



# Users whose Queries are handled with Qname Minimization

## 2019 Results


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## 2020 Results

Experiments	Qmin	Query Type			
		NS	A	AAAA	
357,905,595	63,515,319	4,092,581	59,705,773	-	
	18%	1%	17%	0%	% of all experiments
		6%	94%	0%	% of Qmin experiments

# Daily Results - 2020

QMin Daily Experiment Totals



Yes, this is a relatively brief 8-week measurement but the rate is not growing, and may even be declining a little!


# Where are these Users?

CC	Qmin	Exps.	Qmin Count	Name
GL	80%	3,433	2,738	Greenland
LI	58%	3,172	1,838	Liechtenstein
MG	56%	423,638	237,652	Madagascar
CY	56%	93,687	52,084	Cyprus
KP	53%	4,192	2,201	DPR Korea
NE	50%	424,271	214,168	Niger
IN	49%	52,608,437	25,665,243	India
GI	48%	3,348	1,616	Gibraltar
NP	48%	634,466	302,691	Nepal
IQ	47%	3,271,159	1,551,627	Iraq
BW	47%	92,113	43,653	Botswana
AF	43%	476,157	205,127	Afghanistan
DE	43%	6,012,110	2,583,028	Germany
IR	41%	5,532,777	2,294,737	Iran
PH	41%	6,384,131	2,605,019	Philippines
SI	39%	151,910	59,964	Slovenia
GE	39%	241,814	94,950	Georgia
TG	39%	121,776	47,704	Togo
MV	38%	33,549	12,658	Maldives
ZW	37%	423,739	158,741	Zimbabwe
GM	36%	47,920	17,031	Gambia
PT	34%	696,889	237,476	Portugal
BY	33%	661,704	220,477	Belarus
ZA	33%	3,084,863	1,022,078	South Africa
NZ	31%	387,654	120,774	New Zealand
FR	30%	4,624,666	1,400,750	France
AD	29%	6,647	1,932	Andorra
GH	29%	1,197,502	346,091	Ghana
MD	29%	293,043	84,263	Moldova
SG	29%	439,993	125,506	Singapore
CM	28%	566,820	161,204	Cameroon
IS	27%	28,563	7,637	Iceland
AO	27%	468,063	124,893	Angola
CG	27%	46,923	12,484	Congo

# Resolver Measures

## What's a “resolver”?

- Always hard to tell these days.
- Over a 16 day period we saw 183,438 distinct IP addresses of resolvers
  - 148,230 IPv4 addresses  
77,548 distinct /24 subnets
  - 35,209 IPv6 addresses  
9,069 distinct /48 subnets



# Open Resolvers

Resolver	Qmin Ratio	Experiments	Qmin
googlepdns	0%	222,266,568	2,909
114dns	5%	49,267,636	2,671,180
yandex	0%	28,164,377	238
dnspai	5%	19,787,850	923,698
cloudflare	50%	18,296,672	9,205,045
onedns	7%	15,838,970	1,058,729
opendns	71%	15,488,084	10,997,436
level3	0%	3,083,038	-
quad9	67%	2,537,980	1,703,220
neustar	55%	1,649,393	909,871
vrsgn	0%	1,536,303	-
dyn	55%	558,821	306,645
dnswatch	55%	518,237	287,119
cnic	0%	515,878	-
greenteamdns	0%	421,532	114
he	83%	176,262	146,637
comodo	26%	112,308	29,613
freedns	0%	87,804	-
dnspod	0%	54,164	46

What's behind these 50÷-70÷ ratios? is Qmin only partially deployed in the DNS service anycast constellation?

This is more expected!

# ISP Resolvers

ASN	QMin Ratio	Experiments	Qmin	Name	CC
4134	8%	272,985,533	22,389,630	CHINANET-BACKBONE	CN
55836	56%	103,846,458	58,615,952	Reliance Jio	IN
4837	5%	52,525,073	2,884,098	CHINA UNICOM	CN
9808	5%	44,902,506	2,399,098	Guangdong Mobile	CN
9498	0%	36,424,784	113	BHARTI Airtel BBIL	IN
58543	0%	35,255,383	-	CHINATELECOM Guangdong	CN
56046	41%	31,490,572	12,941,229	China Mobile Jiangsu	CN
56040	0%	19,782,214	144	China Mobile Guangdong	CN
7922	0%	18,081,958	2,460	COMCAST	US
4835	47%	15,634,509	7,345,689	CHINANET-IDC-SN China Telecom	CN
24560	0%	14,859,198	62	Bharti Airtel Broadband	IN
56041	0%	10,645,009	48,689	China Mobile Zhejiang	CN
6730	50%	9,398,245	4,723,646	SUNRISE	CH
24445	1%	8,922,489	85,080	Henan Mobile	CN
38266	1%	8,895,802	125,353	Vodafone India	IN
7552	0%	8,891,315	636	Viettel	VN
17676	2%	8,714,412	199,840	Softbank BB	JP
30986	32%	8,029,250	2,546,706	SCANCOM	GH
8151	0%	7,881,161	1,193	Uninet	MX
7018	0%	7,870,637	874	ATT INTERNET	US
28573	0%	7,837,132	521	CLARO	BR
4766	0%	7,629,352	280	Korea Telecom	KR
9121	0%	7,340,736	826	TTNET	TR
27725	0%	6,661,765	12,907	Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba	CU
3462	0%	6,599,708	452	HINET	TW

# Observations

- Query name minimisation is gathering momentum in the past 12 months (3% of users in mid 2019 to 18% of users in mid-2020)
- While all common vendor code has enabled Query name minimisation, enabling this behaviour in ISP and open resolvers is fragmentary
  - Why is it not deployed? What's the concern?

# Our Measurement

- We are using the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> level names to perform the experiment  
*<unique-label> . ent-<unique label> . <geo-code> . <common\_name> . net*
  - Some resolvers (Google?) only perform QName minimisation to the 3<sup>rd</sup> level
  - Why?
  - **Is privacy no longer important at the bottom of the name hierarchy?**
  - **Or is it only TLD servers that breach privacy in query names?**
  - **Or are recursive operators just making it up on the fly?**



# More Questions

- **Where and why is Query Name minimisation important?**
- Does it differ by scale?
  - Small scale recursive resolvers at the edge of the network?
  - ISP-operated recursive resolvers?
  - Open recursive resolvers?
- Is the query name alone a privacy threat or is the combination of the recursive resolver with the query name the problem?

# Last Question

What's the most critical privacy risk in today's DNS?

- Explicit Client Subnet?
- Full query name without attribution from recursive to authoritative?
- Recursive resolvers seeing both the full query name and attribution?
- Unencrypted stub-to-recursive DNS transactions?
- Unencrypted recursive-to-authoritative DNS transactions?

Thanks!